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ABSTRACT 
Information and cyber security activities has become a major part of companies pro-
cesses because of the increasing number of devices and systems that are online and con-
nected to internet. However, information systems should be under cyclic monitoring 
which implementation can be a demanding task for a small and medium sized company 
for example because of the lack of available resources. This study aims to develop a se-
curity evaluation method which can be easily integrated into small or medium sized 
companies’ processes because of its straightforward and simple approach. Additionally, 
this study aims to develop a script which can be used for the testing purposes of the new 
security evaluation method.  
 
The study was conducted by first gathering the requirements for the evaluation criteria 
which were then used to design the new security evaluation method. The inputs for the 
evaluation process were based on vulnerability severity and amount. The mentioned in-
put attributes were also used to develop proposals for the calculation process. As an out-
put the security evaluation method provided a single integer which described the target 
systems information security level. At the end of the study, the created security evalua-
tion method was tested against three test cases which were used to evaluate the effect of 
different proposals and audit results for the output. A script was also developed for the 
testing purposes. 
 
The results and analyses indicated that the developed security evaluation method was 
easier to integrate into small businesses processes because of its simplicity and straight-
forward approach. In addition, the issue frequency-based proposal which considered the 
business criticality and weighted average proved to be most suitable approach for the 
security state evaluation. However, the results also indicated that the weights used in the 
calculations should be raised in order to achieve a more descriptive picture of the state. 
The further development suggestions proposed that the created security evaluation 
method could be developed towards a more system-based approach instead of the case-
based approach. In addition, the evaluation method could be integrated as a part of a 
service which calculates and evaluates the state of information security in the target sys-
tem based on the input. 
KEYWORDS: Information security measurement, Information security evaluation, Se-
curity frameworks 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Eri järjestelmien tietoturvasta on tullut iso osa organisaatioiden prosesseja internettiin 
kytkettyjen laitteiden ja järjestelmien määrän kasvun takia. Tietojärjestelmien tulisi 
kuitenkin olla säännöllisen valvonnan alla ja tämän toteuttaminen saattaa olla vaikeaa 
pienille ja keskisuurille yrityksille, esimerkiksi resurssien puutteen vuoksi. Tämän 
tutkimuksen tavoitteena on kehittää uusi yksinkertainen järjestelmän tietoturvan 
arviointimenetelmä, joka on helppo integroida osaksi pienten ja keskisuurten yritysten 
prosesseja sen yksinkertaisen lähestymistavan ansiosta. Lisäksi tavoitteena on kehittää 
skripti, jota voidaan käyttää uuden laskentatavan testaamiseen.  
Tutkimus aloitettiin keräämällä vaatimukset kehitettävälle järjestelmän tietoturvan 
arviointimenetelmälle, joita käytettiin uuden mittaustavan suunnittelussa. Uuden 
mittaustavan syötteenä käytettiin auditointien tuloksia sekä haavoittuvuuksien määrää ja 
niiden vakavuutta. Mainituista attribuuteista kehitettiin myös laskentaehdotukset. 
Ulostulona laskentatavat tuottivat luvun, joka kuvaa kohdejärjestelmän sen hetkistä 
tietoturvallisuuden tilaa. Tutkimuksen lopuksi luotua arviointimenetelmää ja sen 
tuottamia tuloksia testattiin kolmessa eri testitapauksessa, joissa verrattiin eri 
laskentatapojen vaikutusta kohdejärjestelmän tietoturvan tason laskentaan. Testejä varten 
kehitettiin skripti, joka suoritti laskennan. 
Tulokset ja niiden analysointi indikoivat, että kehitetty arviointimenetelmä on helpompi 
integroida osaksi pienen yrityksen prosesseja sen yksinkertaisuuden ja suoraviivaisuuden 
takia. Lisäksi parhaimmaksi tietoturvan laskentatavaksi tutkimuksessa olevista 
vaihtoehdoista osoittautua havaintojen määrään pohjautuva laskutapa, joka huomioi 
järjestelmän bisneskriittisyyden ja laskee koko ympäristön tietoturvan tason käyttäen 
painotettua keskiarvoa. Lisäksi tulokset kuitenkin osoittivat, että laskentaan käytettäviä 
painoja tulisi nostaa kuvaavamman tuloksen saamiseksi. Jatkokehitysideat sisälsivät 
ehdotuksen arviointimenetelmän jatkokehityksestä järjestelmäkohtaisempaan suuntaan, 
jossa tutkittaisiin järjestelmälle suoritettuja toimenpiteitä yksittäisten auditointien sijasta. 
Lisäksi kehitetty arviointimenetelmä voitaisiin integroida tulevaisuudessa osaksi 
palvelua, joka laskee syötteen perusteella kohdejärjestelmälle tietoturvallisuuden tason.  
AVAINSANAT: Tietoturvan mittaus, Tietoturvan tilan arviointi, Tietoturvaviitekehys 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays different parties are connecting more and more systems and devices online 
due to the advances of the internet (Katole, Sherekar & Thakare 2018: 1). These systems 
can also contain sensitive information which is one of the most crucial resources. New 
technologies are also developed and together they are exposing the systems and applica-
tions used in them into variety of different threats such as information leaks and virus 
infections. (Golyash, Sachenko & Rippa 2011.) In addition, if the system is for example 
a public service which gathers sensitive data of its users, the data must be protected at rest 
and in transit with different mitigation processes such as access controls and encryption. 
Therefore, information and cyber security has become a major part of companies’ pro-
cesses. (Von Solms 2001: 215.) 
In order to protect their information systems and data stored in them, companies can eval-
uate target systems state in terms of information security by executing audits to the target 
systems. These audits can be executed by utilizing different frameworks which are of-
fered by different authorities. The frameworks can be used as the guideline when the 
target systems information security is evaluated (NIST 2018, a: 1). However, in some 
cases the frameworks can be challenging and time consuming to integrate into a small 
and medium sized company’s processes because of their layered structure and size. There-
fore, a new security evaluation method could be developed to ease the evaluation process. 
This study will offer a solution for a smaller company to evaluate their information sys-
tems state in terms of information security. The thesis will cover basics of security, the 
already available frameworks, the design of the new information security evaluation 
method and script. The thesis will also introduce three different calculation proposals 
which can be used to evaluate the security of the target system. These proposals will be 
then tested against three different test cases. The results of the test cases will be then used 
to evaluate and analyze the created security evaluation method, the functioning of the 
script and to analyze the different calculation proposals together. At the end of the thesis, 
conclusions will be presented with further recommendations on how to utilize or develop 
the security evaluation method in the future. 
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1.1 Background 
This study is done as an assignment to a private company. The topic came from the tech-
nical unit of the company because there is a need for automating and simplifying the 
processes in evaluating the target systems security state. In addition, the developed secu-
rity evaluation method could be used for continuous security measurement of the target 
information system because of its simplicity and integration possibilities. 
1.2 Objective 
This study aims to develop and offer a solution for a smaller company to evaluate their 
information systems state in terms of information security. As a result, a new evaluation 
method will be designed, developed and proposed. The aim of the study is also to develop 
a script which can be used for the testing purposes of the new security evaluation method. 
In addition, this thesis will provide or offer ideas on the integration possibilities of the 
developed security evaluation method into company’s processes in the future. 
1.3 Scope 
The scope of the thesis is primarily limited to the design of the new security evaluation 
method and to the implementation of the script. In addition, the result will only be com-
pared to the two most utilized or common available frameworks which are the NIST (Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology) cyber security framework and CIS (Center 
for Information Security) Critical Security Controls. Other possible security frameworks 
are not taken into account in the comparison.  
The new security evaluation method is primarily developed considering the needs and 
requirements set by the company who ordered the thesis. Thus, the security evaluation 
method can mainly be utilized internally by the company. Additionally, the script which 
will be developed in the thesis is mainly intended for testing purposes. However, the script 
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will be designed and developed so that it can also be used in a production environment 
with minor changes. The further implementation or integration of the result is not in-
cluded in this thesis and it will be left to internal development. 
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2 SECURITY OF SYSTEMS 
Information and cyber security of different systems are a crucial part of companies pro-
cesses due to increasing reliability on IT (Information Technology) and increasing com-
plexity of different infrastructures (Bowen, Hash & Wilson 2006: 2). This chapter will 
cover basics of information and cyber security including the definition, the CIA (Confi-
dentiality, Integrity, Availability) triad and different attack types and mitigation mecha-
nisms. 
2.1 Definition 
Information and cyber security are often considered and misunderstood as the same thing. 
Although they both concern the security and protection of different systems, these terms 
are not equal and there is a clear separation between them (Fasulo 2019). Both terms are 
presented in the following chapters. 
2.1.1 Information Security 
Information security can be defined as the protection of information from unauthorized 
operations such as access, use and disclosure. The goal of information security related 
operations is to ensure and implement confidentiality, integrity and availability for the 
information in transit and at rest (Nieles, Dempsey & Yan Pillitteri 2017: 7). Abruptly, 
this means that the information in transit or at rest should not be altered in any way nor it 
should not readable by an unauthorized party. In addition, the objective of information 
security is to ensure that business related processes can remain continuous and damage 
impact to different systems are limited (Von Solms & van Niekerk 2013). For example, 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines information security 
in the following way: 
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“The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability” (Paulsen & Byers 2019: 94). 
2.1.2 Cyber security 
As Information security is oriented towards all aspects of the information of data in terms 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability, cyber security considers almost everything 
that can be reached via cyberspace. Cyberspace can be defined as an operational environ-
ment which is formed from different digital information systems. This means that in prac-
tice cyber security considers the protection of different appliances and for example the 
security of critical computer infrastructures. (Von Solms & Niekerk 2013.) For example, 
the Kaspersky lab defines the cyber security in the following way:  
“Cyber-security is the practice of defending computers, servers, mobile devices, elec-
tronic systems, networks, and data from malicious attacks. It's also known as information 
technology security or electronic information security.” (Kaspersky labs 2019.) 
Cyber security can also be divided into six different domains or layers which are network, 
application, operational and information security and disaster recovery and end-user ed-
ucation. The network security layer attempts to secure the network from attackers and 
from intruders with different operations such as firewall policies. The application security 
domain attempts to protect the applications or software’s that are running on different 
devices. The operational security includes the processes that are related to data handling. 
In addition, operational security takes into account different privilege levels and access 
controls. The disaster recovery (Incident response) examines how for example an organ-
ization reacts to a data breach or some other loss of data or operations. The domain also 
includes the policies for the restoring activities after the incident. End-user education ex-
amines the social side of the cyber security by taking into account the people that are 
interacting with for example some information system. By educating people on different 
threats such as attack types that can be executed for instance with email, the company can 
save itself from cyber security incidents. (Kaspersky labs 2019.) 
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2.2 CIA triad 
The CIA triad forms the base for information security in the IT field. The triad concerns 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the target system or the data. These con-
cepts can be viewed as the objectives regarding the IT field. However, the definition for 
the triad can differ based on the assets that they are targeting. (Oscarson: 4.) In this chap-
ter, the triad is reviewed based on information assets. The basic CIA triad can be described 
for example with the figure below. (Figure 1.) 
 
Figure 1. The CIA triad (Ko, Osei-Bryson & Dorantes 2006: 8) 
2.2.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality means that the information assets or the data in them is not disclosed by 
an unauthorized party including different individuals, entities and processes (Oscarson: 
4). In other words, this means that the data which is in transit or stored for example into 
a database by some web application, cannot be read by an attacker which exploits some 
vulnerability that is present in the system or in the application itself. This security prop-
erty indicates that if your data or information is not confidential it is considered as inse-
cure (Pender-Bey 2012: 8). 
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2.2.2 Integrity 
Integrity refers to the manipulation or modification of the data in transit or at rest in an 
unwanted way (Oscarson: 4). By achieving full integrity of the information asset, an un-
authorized party should not be able to modify the data that is present in the application or 
in the system. In order to maintain integrity, there needs to be processes that will prevent 
undesirable actions or changes to the data. This can be achieved for example by using 
authentication mechanisms which prevent undesired changes to the data. In addition to 
the undesirable action prevention, the data should be easily recoverable. (Pender-Bey 
2012: 12.) 
2.2.3 Availability 
Availability refers to the authorized access of the data. When full availability is achieved, 
the information asset should always be available when needed for the authorized party. 
(Oscarson: 4.) If the availability is affected for example by an attacker and users are not 
able to access an information asset at will, the total availability of the asset is lost. Any 
unauthorized accesses should be denied, and the system should also be resistant against 
different Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
2.2.4 Additions to the triad (Parkerian hexad) 
In 2002, information security consultant, Donn B. Parker introduced a more complex and 
comprehensive variation of the CIA triad known as the Parkerian hexad. The Parkerian 
hexad adds three more components or elements to the CIA triad which are the authentic-
ity, utility and possession. The Parkerian hexad is presented in the figure below. (Figure 
2.) 
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Figure 2. Parkerian hexad (Pender-Bey 2012: 7) 
Authenticity adds the proof of identity to the triad. The main objective of the authenticity 
is to ensure that the message or transaction is from the source that it states to be. This 
property is highly critical when considering high security systems such as online bank 
services. The authenticity of a transaction can for example be verified with digital certif-
icates which are issued by predefined and trusted Certificate Authorities (CA). The digital 
certificates are used to proof the identity of the service provider. (Pender-Bey 2012: 14.)  
Utility property is used to measure the usefulness of the data. For example, if the data in 
transit is encrypted and the third party which receives the message does not know the key 
or the password to decrypt the message, the message comes useless to the receiver be-
cause it is in an unreadable state. (Pender-Bey 2012: 17-18.) 
Possession property defines another component to the triad which is related to the pos-
session of the data. The property claims that any confidential information or data can be 
controlled or be possessed by an unauthorized party without risking the confidentiality. 
However, in addition if the device which has the confidential data stored into a hard drive 
is stolen it offers the unauthorized party an opportunity to retrieve the data. This can be 
mitigated for example by enabling disk encryption. (Pender-Bey 2012: 11-12.) 
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2.3 Examples of different attacks types and threats 
Attackers or malicious parties can attack information systems with various of different 
techniques. By leveraging for example different vulnerabilities which are present in the 
service, the attacker can cause serious damage to the confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability of the target service. This chapter will only cover some of the most recognizable 
attack types and vectors which are injection attacks, cross-site scripting (XSS) and Denial 
of Service (DoS). The attack types are mentioned in an order which is compatible to CIA. 
2.3.1 Injection attacks 
Injection attacks are one of the most common attack types that are facing different appli-
cations nowadays. For example, OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) has 
ranked injection-based attacks in their publications as the most crucial flaw that is affect-
ing different information systems. OWASP is an association which purpose is to support 
the secure development of web applications. Different injection type attacks are for ex-
ample SQL (Structured Query Language) and XML (Extensible Markup Language) in-
jections. (OWASP 2017, a.) 
Typically, an application is vulnerable to injection attacks when the user-supplied data is 
not filtered or sanitized. Therefore, the attacker can inject or manipulate the backend que-
ries and force the application to return data for which the party is not authorized to access. 
This can lead to data loss, corruption or information disclosure to unauthorized parties. 
The impact for the business is very dependent of the criticality of the data. (OWASP 2017, 
a.) 
The prevention for these types of attacks is heavily related to the arbitrary user input 
validation and keeping the supplied data separate from backend commands. The input 
validation could for example be implemented using a whitelist which only accepts certain 
characters. In terms of for example SQL injection attacks, parameterized queries can be 
used for mitigation. (OWASP 2017, a.) Parameterized queries are a method in which the 
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SQL statement is first precompiled or defined and after that the parameters are passed to 
the query (Reetz 2017: 3.) 
2.3.2 Cross-site scripting (XSS) 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks are also one of the most recognizable and well known 
attack types in modern web applications (Pranathi, Kranthi, Srisaila & Madhavilatha 
2018: 1). In a cross-site scripting attack, the attacker is able to inject malicious arbitrary 
JavaScript into the application which will then be executed by the browser with other 
users’ privileges (CIS 2017, a: 1). An XSS flaw can be used to hijack users’ sessions and 
steal other sensitive information stored by the browser (OWASP 2017, b). 
There are three types of XSS which are reflected, stored and DOM (Document Object 
Model). In reflected XSS the user supplied script is reflected to the server’s response 
without any sanitation or filtering. Therefore, when the application is rendered by the 
browser the malicious script will run. In stored XSS, the malicious script is saved for 
example into applications database without sanitation.  Therefore, if client and server-
side sanitations or filtering are not implemented, the payload gets executed whenever the 
application accesses the database and reflects the payload to the response. In DOM based 
XSS, the malicious script modifies the DOM environment so that the original client-side 
code is executed in an unexpected way which results into client-side code execution. 
(OWASP 2017, b.) 
The XSS flaws can be mitigated for example by using input sanitation and filtering. In 
addition, different frameworks can be used in the development process to automatically 
escape the malicious characters from the user input and therefore prevent malicious script 
execution. (OWASP 2017, b.) 
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2.3.3 Denial of Service (DoS) 
Denial of Service attacks are one of the most common attack types in which the attacker 
interrupts a services availability to legitimate users by consuming its resources. The num-
ber of Denial of Service attacks are also increasing because the attacks sometimes does 
not require much technical knowledge and automated tools are available for the execu-
tion. On a general level, there are two types of Denial of Service attacks which are net-
work and application level attacks. In a network level attack, the attacker consumes the 
network bandwidth and computing resources of the target. In an application level attack, 
the attacker abuses and exploits a logical flaw that leads into increasing consumption of 
system resources. (Soliman & Azer 2018.) 
Denial of Service attacks can also be distributed. These are called DDoS (Distributed 
Denial of Service) attacks in which the attacker uses multiple machines to attack into a 
certain target. (Gupta, N & Jain & Saini & Gupta, V. 2016.) 
2.4 Basic protection mechanisms 
Although, the malicious parties have many ways and techniques to exploit and abuse the 
vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in a system, the attacks impact can be mitigated by 
following certain principles. In this chapter, some mitigation techniques are presented 
including regular updates, encryption, backups, access controls and continuous audits.  
2.4.1 Updates 
By applying regular updates to the software’s running in the information systems, a lot of 
different attacks can be mitigated. The usage of components with known vulnerabilities 
is one of the most common issues present in the systems according to OWASP (OWASP 
2017, c). By using old components in the systems, the attackers can leverage and exploit 
already found vulnerabilities which are present in the outdated component and for exam-
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ple get unauthorized access to the system. Although the dangers of using outdated com-
ponents are known and the vulnerabilities could be easily fixed by just applying regular 
updates, many organizations are not implementing regular updates into their systems. 
(National Cyber Security Center 2018.) 
2.4.2 Encryption 
Encryption can be used to protect the confidentiality of the data. It is a mathematical 
operation which transform the plaintext data using a long enough key into a format which 
is not easily understood by people. After the transformation the output should not reveal 
or hint anything about the data that was transformed. In order to read the data again, the 
data should be decrypted using a key. In order to prevent the attackers from decrypting 
the data, the key must be secret and should be shared only with the involving parties. 
(Stine & Dang: 1-2.) The basic principle of encryption is figured below. (Figure 3.) 
 
Figure 3. Encryption described in a general level (Stine & Dang: 2) 
2.4.3 Backups and recovery plan 
Backups are copies of files and programs which are used to recover from unspecified 
states. They can be used as a part of a recovery plan. Recovery plan is a set of procedures 
which main objective is to achieve full restoration after for example a data breach or 
malware infection. (Bartock, Cichonski, Souppaya, Smith, Witte & Scarfone 2016: 1.) 
According to the National Cyber Security Center (2018: 43) many organizations do not 
have a sufficient recovery and backup restoration plans.  
 
 22 
2.4.4 Access controls 
In order to prevent for example unauthorized operations, proper access controls must be 
implemented to the system. The main purpose for access controls is to limit the operations 
that a certain application or user can perform or execute. (Mudarri & Al-Rabeei 2015: 1.) 
Without proper access controls unauthorized users could read and modify data. Therefore, 
determining an access policy is crucial in terms of systems security. 
2.4.5 Continuous audits and reviews 
Information security audits and reviews can be used as tool to monitor the security level 
of a certain system. In a security audit some party examines the target infrastructure or 
system critically and reports the findings to the owner of the target. These findings can 
for example be vulnerabilities that are present in the service or policies that are not met. 
By executing these audits continuously and on a certain interval the target systems infor-
mation security level can be monitored and enhanced in timely basis. It also offers the 
change to fix the reported security flaws before the application is taken into production.  
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3 SECURITY FRAMEWORKS 
Different security frameworks can be used as a tool for security audits and reviews. The 
main purpose for the frameworks is to offer a solid base for determining the state of se-
curity in the target system. This chapter will define and examine the structure of two 
different security frameworks which are the NIST cyber security framework and CIS crit-
ical security controls. In addition to the definitions, the usage and structures of the frame-
works are presented. 
3.1 Definition 
In general framework refers to a conceptual structure which can be utilized as a guideline 
for creating different concepts. As an output the framework usually extends the compo-
sition into something functional and useful. (Rouse 2015.) Hence, a security framework 
can serve as a model which strengthens the security of the target infrastructures (NIST 
2018, a). 
3.2 NIST cyber security framework 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology has developed a framework which 
main purpose is to enhance the security risk management in target systems and infrastruc-
tures. The framework will provide an organizing structure for different approaches in 
terms of security by combining working standards, guidelines and practices productively 
and flexibly together. It is designed to function regardless of their focus in security in the 
target organization. Thus, the framework can for example be applied in IT (Information 
Technology), industrial control systems (ICS) and Internet of Things (IoT). Although the 
framework can be applied to multiple different use-cases, it cannot be used as an inclusive 
approach because the technologies that are affecting target systems are always evolving 
and thus creating new different attack vectors and risks. (NIST 2018, a.) 
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The framework will use the standards and guidelines to determine current security posture 
and state of the target. In addition, it attempts to identify and prioritize the parts that can 
be used in continuous improvement processes and investigate the progress towards the 
target security state of the system. It also offers new angles on how to communicate dif-
ferent security risks internally and externally. (NIST 2018, a.) 
By now the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released two dif-
ferent versions of the framework which are the versions 1.0 and 1.1 (NIST 2018, a). The 
most recent one (version 1.1) will be presented and gone through in this chapter.  
3.2.1 Structure 
The framework can be implemented by following a risk-based approach. It consists of 
three different components which are the core, implementation tiers and profile. (NIST 
2018, a.) 
The core component contains the activities, outcomes and suitable references that are 
universally separated between different critical infrastructures. It also addresses the com-
munication of security activities across the whole target organization. These requirements 
have been transformed into five different functions which are called identify, protect, de-
tect, respond and recover. (NIST 2018, a.) 
The identify function is used to refine the organizational consensus in understanding on 
how to manage different risks, systems, people and data. It helps the organization to better 
identify and understand the business context and their resources in terms of security risks. 
(NIST 2018, a.) 
The protect function is used for the detection of different access controls or safeguards 
concerning the organizations resources. It endorses to limit the impact of a cyber-security 
event. (NIST 2018, a.) 
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The detection function concerns monitoring activities which are present in the target 
systems. It supports the development and implementation of proper cyber event and 
anomaly identification. (NIST 2018, a.) 
The respond function states and supports the activities after a cyber-event or anomaly 
have been detected. These activities can be used to decrease the impact of the cyber se-
curity incident. (NIST 2018, a.) 
The recover function supports the development of activities after a cyber-event has hap-
pened. It is used to help maintain plans and restoration capabilities of the affected system. 
(NIST 2018, a.) 
The functions are also divided into categories and subcategories which purpose is to iden-
tify the hidden outcomes. Example of a category in the protect function could be “access 
control” which subcategory could be “data at rest is protected”. These outcomes are then 
matched with different informative references which can be existing standards or guide-
lines concerning the subcategories. (NIST 2018, a.) A picture of the framework core is 
presented in the figure below. (Figure 4.) 
 
Figure 4. The core structure of NIST cyber security framework. (NIST 2018, a) 
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Another component in the framework is the implementation tiers which offer angles on 
how a company could view the underlying risks and how the risks should be managed. 
They attempt to provide solutions and determine the extent to which security management 
is informed. In addition, it tries to determine how the risk management process is inte-
grated into companies’ activities. The tiers vary between tier 1 and tier 4 (partial, risk 
informed, repeatable and adaptive): tier 1 being the most concise where the organizations 
risk management processes are not planned and tier 4 being the most comprehensive in 
which the organization cyber security related activities are designed and continuously 
improved. The tiers are also divided into three components which are the risk manage-
ment processes, integrated management program and external participation. (NIST 2018, 
a.) A figure of the tiers is presented below. (Figure 5.) 
 
Figure 5. Implementation tiers (NIST 2018, b.) 
After the target organization has investigated its internal and external processes concern-
ing security, the framework can be used to create a profile which can be utilized as a 
roadmap for decreasing the possibility of cyber threats. The profile could include for ex-
ample goals which should be met. Depending on the complexity of the target company, 
multiple profiles can be utilized and created (NIST 2018, a.) 
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3.2.2 Usage 
In order to utilize the full potential of the framework, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology suggests that a seven-step plan could be used in the implementation pro-
cess. (NIST 2018, a.) 
Prioritizing and scoping is the first step. This step includes the identification of the or-
ganizations business priorities. By starting the framework implementation process from 
this, the organization can make a more detailed and strategic decisions considering the 
security of present systems. (NIST 2018, a.) 
Orient is the second step, which includes the identification of related systems, require-
ments and the overall risk approach. The organization can use consultation in the identi-
fication process. (NIST 2018, a.) 
Creation of the current profile is the next step. This step includes the current security 
profile determination. This profile can be used later when the evolvement of security is 
examined. In addition, it will describe the current status of the security in the organization 
by determining the categories and subcategories which are currently reached. (NIST 
2018, a.) 
The risk assessment should then be conducted in which the organization evaluates and 
analyzes the target operational environment and determines the probability of a security 
incident. The organization can make the evaluation internally or use external sources such 
as consulting in order to gain a broader view of the threats. (NIST 2018, a.) 
New target profile is created after the risk assessment step is done. In this step the or-
ganization should focus on the categories and subcategories of the framework and deter-
mine the desired outputs for them. (NIST 2018, a.) 
Determine, prioritize and analyze gaps is the sixth step. In this step the organization 
uses the current profile created in the third step and determines, analyzes and prioritizes 
gaps compared to the new target profile. This comparing process will be beneficial in 
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determining the security gaps. This step also includes the designing process of the action 
plan which has the desired improvements in a prioritized order. (NIST 2018, a.) 
Action plan implementation is the last step. In this step the organization identifies the 
gaps and deficiencies and adjust the current cyber security practices in order to fulfil the 
objectives determined in the target profile.  (NIST 2018, a.)  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST 2018, a) also addresses that 
the implementation of the framework could be continuous and executed in certain inter-
vals in order to achieve improvement in the security aspect. Organization could also 
choose the steps which are crucial to them and monitor their progress (NIST 2018, a). 
3.3 CIS critical security controls 
CIS (Center for Internet Security) is a non-profit association which objective is to protect 
the private and public organizations from cyber threats. The association has developed 
multiple benchmarks and guidelines which can be used in securing IT systems and the 
data stored in them. (CIS 2019, b) One of these guidelines is called critical security con-
trols which includes multiple different entities which can be used to improve the security 
of the target system. 
The CIS critical security controls is a framework which contains 20 recommended actions 
for the mitigation of different cyber threats and malicious actions. The different compo-
nents are gathered and analyzed from the most common attack vectors used and reported 
in the industry. By splitting the framework into 20 different components, it allows the 
organization to focus into a smaller segment of actions. This can enable the organization 
to achieve better results. (SANS 2020) 
The critical security controls framework is under continuous development and the CIS 
association has published multiple versions of it. In this chapter, the newest version avail-
able during the written process of this thesis (version 7.1) will be evaluated and analyzed.     
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3.3.1 Structure 
The framework consists of three different base entities which are the basic, foundational 
and organizational controls. These controls include subcategories or components which 
are each assessing a certain feature in the target environment. The structure of the frame-
work is figured below. (Figure 6.) 
 
Figure 6. CIS cyber security controls components (CIS 2019, c) 
The basic control includes trivial features or actions which should be considered when-
ever systems are deployed in a secure manner. The basic control includes the inventory 
and control of hardware and software assets, continuous vulnerability management, con-
trolled use of administrative privileges, secure configuration and the monitoring and 
maintenance of audit logs. (CIS 2019, c.) 
The inventory component addresses the access controls of the hardware and software’s 
which are present in the target environment. It also specifies the identification of the un-
authorized and unmanaged devices and software’s. The continuous vulnerability manage-
ment control indicates that the target environment should be continuously audited in order 
to identify and fix new threats or vulnerabilities that are present in the implementation. 
This can prevent the attackers from gaining access to the system and protect the system 
from different emerging threats. (CIS 2019, c.) 
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In order to enhance the security in the basic level, the systems need to be configured 
securely and also monitored and maintained continuously. These procedures can help the 
organization to detect, understand and recover from a cyber-attack. (CIS 2019, c.) 
The foundational control extends the basic control by adding data protection fundamen-
tals and access control implementations to the security of the system. This control in-
cludes the email and web browser protections, malware defenses, limitation and control 
of network ports, protocols and services, data recovery, secure configuration of network 
devices, boundary defenses, data protection, controlled and wireless access and account 
monitoring and control. (CIS 2019, c.) 
The first three components in the control (email and web browser protections, malware 
defenses, limitation and control of network ports, protocols and services) are heavily as-
sociated with the mitigation and reduction of the attack surface. For example, the email 
and browser protection component considers the attacker’s human behavior manipulation 
and using the email systems as an attack surface. In other words, the component attempts 
to ensure that only browsers and email clients which are fully supported and allowed 
internally in the organization are utilized and executed. (CIS 2019, c.) 
The last components in the control (secure configuration, boundary defense, data protec-
tion, controlled access, wireless access and account monitoring and control) excluding 
the data recovery capabilities which is related to backup policies, are associated with ac-
cess controls and the detection of malicious activities in the environment. For example, 
these components consider which ports should be closed and which applications and users 
should have rights to execute in the environment. (CIS 2019, c.) 
In addition to basic and foundational controls, the organizational control adds the imple-
mentation of the incident response plan and continuous audits to the company’s pro-
cesses. This control includes the implementation of security awareness and training pro-
grams, application software security, incident response and management and penetration 
tests and red team exercises to the control. These components will cover the identification 
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of security gaps in the organization and the management of software life-cycle by exe-
cuting security reviews. (CIS 2019, c.) 
3.3.2 Usage 
The objective of the CIS critical cyber security control framework is to offer a small, 
prioritized list of actions which can be used to improve the security state of the target 
environment. In addition, the framework offers new angles in terms of security which 
should be taken into account when the organizations security management is considered. 
However, CIS (2019, c) underlines that the framework is not applicable to every situation 
and the user should understand the target environment fully before implementing the 
framework into organizations processes. 
The framework also adds different implementation groups for the prioritization of the 
different controls and components. These can be used as a methodology in the implemen-
tation process. The different implementation groups are shown in the figure below. (Fig-
ure 7) 
 
Figure 7. Implementation groups (CIS 2019, c.) 
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The implementation group 1 mainly considers small companies with approximately 10 
employees. In addition, the controls included in the group 1 are essential to success in the 
security field and these should be implemented into every company’s IT security pro-
gram. These controls are for example continuous automated software updates and active 
logging. (CIS 2019, c.) 
The implementation groups 2 and 3 mainly consider larger organizations which can have 
hundreds of employees, large amount of resources and complex IT systems. However, 
controls included in these groups can also be implemented into a smaller company’s pro-
cesses if necessary. (CIS 2019, c.) 
3.4 Challenges 
Although different security frameworks offer a great base and guideline to different or-
ganization in terms of information and cyber security, the implementation of the frame-
works can have some challenges in some cases. These challenges are for example the lack 
of automation in the processes, multilayered structure and time consumption. 
3.4.1 Lack of automation 
In some cases, the implementation of the security frameworks can require a lot of manual 
work. For example, some of the different issues that are observed in the target environ-
ment are usually gathered and reported manually in these frameworks. In addition, the 
different functions and controls are executed manually. This manual work is targeted to-
wards the organization internal or external resources depending on the party which is 
executing the audit or review. The audit or review can be executed by the organization’s 
internal security section or by a third-party security company. 
Additionally, because of the lack of automation, the frameworks can be difficult to im-
plement into continuous monitoring activities. The frameworks offer a detailed overview 
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of the security state of the system in that specific time when the framework is imple-
mented and used in the evaluation process. However, in order to achieve a detailed de-
scription of the security state continuously, the framework should be implemented man-
ually in a certain interval. Because of the manual load, the implementation can be time 
consuming and difficult to a smaller company. 
In addition to the issue reporting, the frameworks do not automatically evaluate or meas-
ure the information security state of the whole target system. This evaluation process of 
the security state is left for the organization itself. For a small organization this can be an 
overwhelming process when resources are considered. 
3.4.2 Multilayered structure and implementation 
The structure of the frameworks can be complex because they include a lot of different 
functions and controls which will act as the main categories. In addition to the main cat-
egories, subcategories are included to the main functions which splits the functions into 
smaller domains. Thus, implementing the framework into a smaller businesses processes 
can be difficult in some cases. 
Additionally, because of that the implementation of the framework can be more challeng-
ing for a smaller company. Although in theory and in practice by splitting the functions 
into smaller domains, the framework will create a more comprehensive model of the se-
curity state of the target system thus reducing the risk of leaving security misconfigura-
tions to the system. 
3.4.3 Time consumption 
Because of the multilayered structure and lack of automation, the implementation process 
of the framework can be time consuming. Hypothetically, limited resources in smaller 
businesses can also affect the time consumption by some extent. Additionally, in some 
SME oriented companies the resources can be bound to business development activities 
and the general know-how is focused around the core business activities. Therefore, if the 
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core business of the company is not focused around information and cyber security, the 
implementation of a framework can be a demanding task for the company. In these situ-
ations, consultation can be used. However, the consultation process can still demand a lot 
of time. 
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4 DESIGN 
This segment of the thesis is going to present the design of the new security evaluation 
method. The topics presented and discussed in this chapter are constructed based on the 
interviews and to own observations and conclusions regarding the design of the new se-
curity evaluation method. First the requirements of the new evaluation method are pre-
sented thoroughly. These requirements are then used to design and implement the core of 
the evaluation method. 
The core includes the inputs, calculations and output. The inputs have been gathered by 
considering different attributes of audit results. In addition, the calculations have been 
designed based on the audit results. 
Finally, the output will contain the security scores of every system, the whole environ-
ment score and graphs which are based to the calculation outputs. The challenges of the 
already available frameworks have been taken into account in the design process. 
4.1 Research plan 
This study will be conducted by first gathering the requirements from the principal which 
ordered the study. The requirements will be gathered by using qualitative methods such 
as interviews and in addition by analyzing the already available frameworks. 
After the requirements for the new security evaluation method have been gathered, they 
will be analyzed and used to design the new evaluation methods calculations and the 
script which will be developed for testing purposes. The calculations will include three 
proposals which functioning and descriptive properties will be analyzed. 
Finally, after the new security evaluation method have been designed and the script have 
been developed the developed proposals will be run against three different test cases 
which are designed to describe the different characteristics of each calculation proposal. 
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4.2 Requirements for the new security evaluation method 
This chapter covers the technical and conventional requirements for the new information 
security evaluation method. These requirements have been gathered from the principal 
who ordered the thesis and by examining the challenges of implementing a different 
framework. The requirements are not in order of importance 
Ease of implementation is the first requirement for the new security evaluation method. 
The new information security evaluation method has to be easy to be implement into 
company’s processes. In practice this means that the evaluation method should not be too 
complex and layered. In addition, the company or organization who decides to use the 
evaluation method should be able to recognize the problems in their systems easily. By 
designing the evaluation method as simple and straightforward as possible, the companies 
will also obtain benefits in terms of time consumption. The savings in time consumption 
can then translate into better results in terms of profitability and performance. 
Automation is the second requirement for the new security evaluation method. The avail-
able frameworks lack the automation features and they can require a lot of manual work 
if the target system or environment is extensive and complex. The new security evaluation 
method should be designed so that it can be automated easily. Therefore, the architecture 
and calculations in the new security evaluation method should be straightforward and 
understandable. The calculations and the evaluation of the security state of the target en-
vironment should be done automatically. In addition, the monitoring of the security state 
of the target environment should be continuous. The automation will likely benefit the 
performance and profitability of the implementation of the new information security eval-
uation method. 
Continuous monitoring is also a requirement. The new system security evaluation cri-
teria should be feasible to implement as a part of company’s continuous monitoring pro-
cesses. Herewith it should calculate a security score for the system in a certain, feasible 
interval.  
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Maintainability is also considered as a requirement for the new security evaluation 
method. The script used to evaluate the systems security level should be developed so 
that it is easy to maintain and to develop further. Herewith the scripts architecture and 
design should be clear, comprehensible and it should support automated testing activities. 
Unknown information systems which are not audited and are present in the environment 
should also be factored in the calculation processes. By factoring unknown systems in the 
calculations, the company which utilizes the developed system security evaluation criteria 
will get a broader understanding of the whole environment. Therefore, in addition, the 
company can for example plan, design and support its system security enhancement and 
development activities in the future. 
Distinct categories should also be considered in the calculations. Security audits can be 
divided into different categories by factoring distinct characteristics and operations exe-
cuted during the audit. For example, technical audits can contain manual web based pen-
etration testing, scans and architectural reviews of the target environment, information 
security management assessments contain thorough reviews of the target organization 
activities considering also the business assets and evaluates whether certain security func-
tions such as risk controls and incident response plans are addressed properly and are 
compliant with corporate policy (Ghazouni, Medromi, Boulafdour & Sayouti 2013: 1). 
Audit type independence should also be considered in the calculations. The calculations 
executed in the security level evaluation process should not be independent of the audit 
type. In other words, this means that the calculations should be able to implement for any 
audit type or category.  
Business criticality of different systems can have effect on the security evaluation pro-
cess. Organization can have numerous distinct applications which will have different 
business criticality based on the missions they support (Paulsen, Boyens, Bartol & Win-
kler 2018). For example, a banking application has a raised business criticality rate be-
cause it processes and contains highly sensitive data of its users. On the other hand, a 
normal static website which does not handle any sensitive data has a normal business 
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criticality. Therefore, systems present in the target environment should be divided into 
distinct levels in order to achieve a more thorough understanding of the whole environ-
ment and the state of its applications. By dividing systems into business criticality levels, 
it helps the organization to plan and prioritize more business critical systems over other 
systems (Paulsen, Boyens, Bartol & Winkler 2018). 
Scalability properties are important if the security evaluation method will be developed 
in the future. The new information security evaluation method should be developed so 
that it can be scaled to assess security in a more comprehensive level than in single system 
level. Thus, the calculations should be developed so that the security state will be calcu-
lated in both system and environment levels. The score of the environment can then be 
used to address the whole security state of the target company.  
4.3 Input parameters 
This chapter covers the distinct input parameters and attributes which are considered in 
the system security level evaluation process. The inputs will be presented in an input file. 
The parameters are described in a security audit level which means that every audit is 
presented in distinct rows in the input file and every entry must implement attributes de-
scribed in this chapter as parameters excluding the systems which have not been audited 
yet but are present in the environment.  
Timestamps will describe when the audit has been executed. The timestamps should be 
represented and appended in string format (Year-Month-Day) to the input file. 
Timestamps will be used for determining the elapsed time between the audits and for 
generating security scores monthly for every system.  
Audit categories should also be considered as an input. Audits can be divided into mul-
tiple different categories based on audit characteristics and type. In this case, the division 
is made on a very general level. Thus, audits are divided into technical audits, information 
security management and scans. 
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CVSS scores (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) is used to determine the charac-
teristics and severity of different vulnerabilities in the target software. The scoring system 
consists of three distinct metric groups which are base, temporal and environmental. The 
base metric describes the characteristics of single a vulnerability. For example, it evalu-
ates the vulnerability by considering the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
caused by the flaw. 
The temporal metric considers the characteristics of the vulnerability that change over 
time. These characteristics include for example the availability of exploit code which is 
bound to time. The more time the malicious users have to develop exploits targeting a 
single vulnerability, more likely exploits will be available. The environmental metric con-
siders the characteristics directed to single system. For example, it includes the business 
criticality of a system into the calculations.  As a result, the calculations will generate a 
value between 0 and 10. The more severe the vulnerability is, the closer the end result is 
to 10. (Forum of Incident Response Security Teams (FIRST) 2019.) 
CVSS scores are used to differentiate various vulnerabilities from each other and to divide 
vulnerabilities into critical, major and minor flaws and issues. The thresholds used in the 
division are partly taken from the CVSS scoring system (Forum of Incident Response 
Security Teams (FIRST) 2019). The minor and major ratings are the same but the high 
and critical ratings are merged into one group. The high and critical ratings are merged in 
order to achieve a simpler design. The thresholds used in the calculations are described 
in the table below. (Table 1.) 
Table 1. Vulnerability thresholds 
Rating CVSS score 
Low 0.1 - 3.9 
Medium 4.0 - 6.9 
Critical 7.0 - 10 
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Vulnerability frequencies per rating will be considered also as an input parameter. The 
ratings will be based on the low, medium and critical ratings (Table 1.). Vulnerabilities 
will be calculated and divided per audit to the input file.  
Audit state evaluation should also factor in the unknown systems which have not been 
audited. This requirement will be described by this parameter. If the system is audited the 
value will be 1 and if it is not, the value will be 0. 
Business criticality of the target system will consider the importance and criticality of 
the environment to the customer. This metric will have three levels which are high, mod-
erate and low. The calculations will modify the weights based on these attributes. 
4.4 Calculation proposals 
The security state evaluation of a target system will be done using mathematical opera-
tions which consider different audit relative attributes such as the frequency of issues and 
the criticality of a single vulnerability. In this thesis three different calculation proposals 
will be presented and examined. These proposals include the issue frequency based, issue 
criticality based and the combination of both the issue frequency per category and criti-
cality. The proposals have been constructed by considering the different results which the 
audit generates. 
4.4.1 Base coefficients 
Coefficients are used in the calculations to weight more severe vulnerabilities over minor 
rated vulnerabilities. This is based on the assumption which specifies that critical vulner-
abilities will have a more significant effect on the whole security state of the system than 
minor vulnerabilities. As a result of that, the more the target application or system has 
more severe vulnerabilities the lower the final security score will be.  The used coeffi-
cients are described in the below table. (Table 2.) 
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Table 2. Base coefficients 
Rating Coefficient 
Low 0.5 
Medium 1.0 
Critical 1.5 
 
4.4.2 Issue frequency based (Proposal 1) 
The first calculation proposal includes the issue frequency per vulnerability category. 
These categories are low, medium and critical and the thresholds are the same as de-
scribed in Table 1. All the vulnerabilities found in the specific audit are divided into those 
categories based on the thresholds and the amount is calculated by adding together all 
observations in specific category. The amount of vulnerabilities in every category is then 
multiplied by the coefficients (Table 2.) corresponding the category rating. This means 
that the amount of critical vulnerabilities is multiplied by 1.5, the amount of major vul-
nerabilities is multiplied by 1.0 and the amount of minor vulnerabilities is multiplied by 
0.5. After that the results of every multiplication are added together and subtracted from 
10. Thus, the final result will be in the range of zero to ten. If the final result after the 
subtraction is negative, the result is rounded up to zero. In addition, the security score will 
decrease by 0.3 monthly if the audit has been executed over a year ago. The calculation 
formula is presented below.  
𝑓(𝑡) =  {
10 − (1.5 ∗ ∑ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 1.0 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 0.5 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑠)                               , 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 12
10 − (1.5 ∗ ∑ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 1.0 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 0.5 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑠) − 0.3 ∗ (𝑡 − 12), 𝑡 ≥ 13,
 (1) 
where t is time in whole months (in whole numbers). 
4.4.3 Issue criticality based (Proposal 2) 
The issue criticality-based approach considers the CVSS scores calculated for every issue. 
The issue ratings and thresholds are the same as described in Table 1. The calculation 
process begins by factoring in all the issues in every category and dividing the CVSS 
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scores by 10. After the division, the modified scores will then be added together and mul-
tiplied by the coefficient which corresponds the addressed category rating. The results of 
every multiplication will then be added together and subtracted from 10. As in the first 
proposal, this proposal also includes the rounding up to zero if the end result is negative. 
Like in proposal one, the security score will decrease by 0.3 monthly if the audit has been 
executed over a year ago. The calculation formula is presented below. 
𝑓(𝑡) = {
10 − (1.5 ∗
∑ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆
10
+ 1.0 ∗
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆
10
+ 0.5 ∗
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆
10
 )                        , 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 12
10 − (1.5 ∗
∑ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆
10
+ 1.0 ∗
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆
10
+ 0.5 ∗
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆
10
) − 0.3 ∗ (𝑡 − 12),  𝑡 ≥ 13,
(2) 
where t is time in whole months (in whole numbers). 
4.4.4 Combination of issue amounts and criticality (Proposal 3) 
The third proposal includes the combination of both the issue amount per category rating 
and the CVSS scores. The calculation process begins by dividing the CVSS scores by 10 
and adding them together in every issue category. After that the result of the addition is 
multiplied by the issue amount in the category and then with the coefficient which corre-
sponds the category rating. The result of every multiplication is then added together and 
subtracted from 10. Like in the first and second proposal, the result is rounded up to zero 
if the result is negative. Like in previous proposals, if the audit has been executed over a 
year ago, the security score will decrease by 0.3 monthly. The calculation formula is pre-
sented below. 
𝑓(𝑡) = {
10 − (1.5 ∗
∑ 𝐴
10
∗ ∑ 𝐷 + 1.0 ∗
∑ 𝐵
10
∗ ∑ 𝐸 + 0.5 ∗
∑ 𝐶
10
∗ ∑ 𝐹)                       , 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 12
10 − (1.5 ∗
∑ 𝐴
10
∗ ∑ 𝐷 + 1.0 ∗
∑ 𝐵
10
∗ ∑ 𝐸 + 0.5 ∗
∑ 𝐶
10
∗ ∑ 𝐹) − 0.3 ∗ (𝑡 − 12), 𝑡 ≥ 13,
      (3) 
where A represents critical CVSS scores, B represents major CVSS scores, C represents 
minor CVSS scores, D represents critical vulnerabilities, E represents major vulnerabili-
ties, F represents minor vulnerabilities and t is time in whole months (in whole numbers). 
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4.5 Factor in business criticality and audit state in calculations 
One of the requirements for the new security evaluation process was that it should also 
consider the business criticality and audit state of a specific system in the calculation 
process. The business criticality and audit state consideration will be considered and ex-
amined per system and environment level. These alternatives will be integrated and tested 
together with the calculation proposals described earlier. 
4.5.1 Per system 
Per system level the calculation coefficients will be modified according to the business 
criticality of the system. In this case the business criticality levels are divided into three 
distinct categories which are high, moderate and normal. Described in a general level, the 
coefficient values will be raised if the business criticality of the system is higher. The 
business criticality levels, and the corresponding coefficients are described below. (Table 
3.) 
Table 3. Coefficients for different business criticality levels 
Business criticality rating Critical Major Low 
High 1.7 1.2 0.7 
Moderate 1.6 1.1 0.6 
Normal 1.5 1.0 0.5 
 
In addition, the security evaluation process will consider unknown systems which have 
not been audited yet. In system level the not audited entities security score will be flagged 
as 0 because without a properly executed audit against the system, the security state can-
not be evaluated precisely. 
4.5.2 Per environment 
The business criticality per environment will be considered using weighted average. In 
general, weighted average refers to a function in which the whole vector of data points is 
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assigned with different weight and divided by the vector of weight data points (Bonfietti 
& Lombardi 2012). In this case, the weighted average is calculated weighing the more 
business critical systems over normal systems by multiplying the calculated security rat-
ing of the system with the corresponding weight value of the business criticality rating. 
The weights assigned to different system with distinct business criticality are described 
below. (Table 4.) 
Table 4. Weights for business criticality levels. 
Business criticality rating Weights 
High 2.0 
Moderate 1.5 
Normal 1.0 
 
The not audited entities will affect the averages as a lowering factor only after system has 
been implemented to the environment because system cannot have an effect to the whole 
score if it does not exist. Therefore, the timestamps for these kind of audits should be set 
accordingly to the implementation date. 
4.6 Output 
As an output the new security evaluation process will generate security scores for system 
level examination and averages for environment level examination. In addition, graphs 
will be generated to support and easier the examination process. 
Security scores will be calculated for every system in every category in monthly interval. 
This is done due to the requirement that every systems security score will decrease if the 
audit has been executed over a year ago. After a year the security score will decrease by 
0.3 every month until a new audit is executed to the system. If the final score is negative, 
the result will be rounded to zero. In addition, the highest value of the score is ten. 
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The averages will be calculated monthly for every environment, audit type and group. 
The averages in these sections are calculated using arithmetic mean in which all the sys-
tem scores in certain month are added together and divided by the frequency of systems 
in the data set. In addition, the weighted average which assigns weights into the security 
scores will also be calculated and examined in some test cases. 
As an output, the security state evaluation will also generate graphs in order to create 
better and more wider understanding of the security state. The graphs will be generated 
for the whole environment, audit type and groups. The whole environment and audit 
group graphs contain only the monthly averages. Audit type graphs contain the monthly 
security scores of every case belonging to that audit type.  
4.7 Security ratings 
Every system will get a security score which will be used to describe the overall security 
state of the system. Additionally, every environment will get a security score which is 
calculated by taking the average between systems present in the target environment. In 
order to better evaluate the overall security state of the target system and environment, 
the security scores generated by the calculations should be mapped into ratings and states. 
The evaluation process will follow the below table in both system and environment levels. 
(Table 5.) 
Table 5. Security ratings for environments. 
Score Rating/State 
9-10 Excellent 
7-9 Good 
5-7 Moderate 
3-5 Insufficient 
1-3 Alarming 
0-1 Critical 
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5 IMPLEMENTATION 
This section will cover the implementation and design of the tests for every calculation 
proposal. The implementation phase of the tests will begin with the design of different 
test cases that will be used to test the different calculation proposals. The test cases will 
include tests that are designed to describe the effects of different calculation proposals to 
the security score. Additionally, the test cases should illustrate the effects of business 
criticality to the end result. After the test cases have been designed the implementation 
will continue with the design and development of the script which will be utilized for the 
testing activities. The script will also be designed and develop so that it can also be uti-
lized in production with minor changes. The development will be done using python. 
5.1 Script implemented for testing 
Automation was one of the requirements for the new security evaluation process. This 
requirement will be fulfilled by designing and implementing a script which handles the 
calculation process and generates the desired output. In addition, by implementing a 
script, the ease of implementation and continuous monitoring requirements will be ful-
filled. Indefinitely, the script will be developed mainly for the testing purposes of the 
designed security evaluation process in this study. 
5.1.1 Python 
Python is used to develop the script. It is a general-purpose programming language which 
can be utilized in variety of different software projects. However, Python is more often 
applied in scripting roles and it is often used because of its readability, productivity, port-
ability and large collection of different libraries and integration possibilities. (Lutz 2009: 
3-6) Thus, because of those features, it was also selected as the main programming lan-
guage in this project. 
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5.1.2 Dradis API 
Dradis API (Application Programming Interface) is used for testing purposes to generate 
arbitrary input data for the developed script. Dradis is a reporting and collaboration frame-
work which is mainly utilized by information security teams (Security Roots Ltd 2020). 
The main reason for the utilization is that Dradis already contains the required data for 
the input file generation including the CVSS scores, titles and timestamps. However, the 
data queried from Dradis will be masked and obfuscated with arbitrary content so that it 
does not refer to original customer cases in any way. This will be done in order to ensure 
that real customer data is not used for testing purposes.  
5.1.3 Input 
The input file for the script will contain all the parameters and attributes which the new 
security state evaluation process will take as an input. These attributes are timestamp, 
audit category, CVSS scores or vulnerability rating frequency depending on the calcula-
tion proposal, audit state and business criticality of the target system. However, if the 
audit is a security review, the issue frequencies are inserted to the issue category columns 
instead of CVSS scores. In this case the format of the input file will be Microsoft Excel 
Workbook (XLSX). The data will be structured to the file in a manner in which every 
entry will implement all the attributes described earlier. A figure containing an example 
of the input file is presented below. (Figure 8.) The example contains only the first five 
entries. 
  
Figure 8. A sample of the input file 
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5.1.4 Output 
As an output the script will generate an excel workbook file which contains the security 
scores for every system or entity. Every system is also divided into different sheets by 
audit type. This means that for example technical audits, information security manage-
ment audits and scans are divided accordingly into distinct sheets. Additionally, the out-
put file will present averages calculated for every audit group and type. The audit group 
averages will be presented in the same sheet as the system for which the audit with the 
specified group has been executed. Averages for the whole environment will be presented 
in a dedicated different sheet. Finally, the security scores for every system will be gener-
ated monthly until the current date and presented audit by audit in the output file. An 
example of the generated output is presented below. (Figure 9.) 
 
Figure 9. A sample of the output file 
Additionally, graphs will be drawn to every sheet displaying the grades and averages in 
the time domain. 
5.1.5 Flowchart 
Flowchart is used to describe the flow of the script in a general level. The flowchart of 
the script is presented in the below figure. (Figure 10.) The execution is described respect 
to test activities. 
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Figure 10. Flowchart 
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The execution of the script starts by scanning the command line parameters which include 
the selection of calculation proposal and whether the calculations should consider the 
business criticality or not. The selections are used later in the calculation process. 
After the command line parameters have been scanned successfully, the script checks if 
the input file exists in the defined path. If the file does not exist, the script will establish 
a connection to the Dradis API, queries the cases and issues, masks the data and then 
generates the input file. On the other hand, if the input file does already exist the execution 
will continue to the parsing of the input file. 
The input file can contain many entries of which are assigned to the same system or case 
with different timestamps. The described scenario can occur if the same system has mul-
tiple audits executed against them. Therefore, the cases are merged together during the 
script execution. The merging of the data is also done because it enables easier data han-
dling during execution. 
After the cases are merged, the script will calculate the security scores monthly according 
to the calculation proposal selected at the beginning of the execution. Additionally, it 
generates the scores and averages monthly for every group and category and for the whole 
environment and divides the scores based on the audit type. Finally, the script will write 
all the data to the excel workbook and generates the graphs. 
5.2 Test case structures 
Every calculation proposal will be tested against three different test cases which include 
tests with the base coefficients, with modified coefficients and with the weighted average. 
Therefore, the test case structure includes nine test cases in total. In this thesis, test case 
one corresponds the test with base coefficients, test case two corresponds the modified 
coefficient test and test case three corresponds the weighted average test. These corre-
spondences are used interchangeably hereafter in this thesis. 
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The main objective of the tests is to examine and criticize the effects of different calcula-
tion proposals to the security score of the system. In addition, the objective is to investi-
gate the effects of different coefficient values to security score by factoring in the business 
criticality of the system. Finally, the tests will provide data for the examination whether 
the business criticality should be considered in the whole environment or per entity or 
system level. 
In order to compare results between different proposals, the same input file will be used 
for every test. Additionally, the input file entries follow the conditions which state that 
the order does matter and issue frequency can only vary between zero and three. This 
means that there are 24 different issue frequency combinations that can be presented in 
the file. Finally, the business criticality must be considered in the calculations and in order 
to compare the effect of business criticality to the systems security level, every case entry 
must contain the same issues frequencies and criticalities with different business critical-
ity levels. Therefore, because there are three different levels, the input file will contain 72 
case entries in total. In addition, the input file will contain three unknown systems to 
simulate the effect to the average in the environment contains corresponding systems. 
Because the calculations are the same for every case category, the input file will only 
contain cases categorized as technical audits. The input file used in testing is presented 
thoroughly in Appendix A. 
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6 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the test results. The proposals presented in the results are the same 
that were presented earlier (see chapter 4.4). Additionally, every test case will follow the 
guideline presented earlier in the thesis (see chapter 5.2) and the results for these cases 
will be presented using the raw data outputs and the graphs. The raw results and graphs 
will be used to analyze and compare together the test results in every test case. Addition-
ally, the results will be criticized and compared to the already available frameworks. Fi-
nally, this chapter will present further recommendations, suggestions and development 
proposals to the developed security evaluation method and script.  
6.1 Test case 1 
In the first test case, the calculations are executed using the base coefficients which were 
presented in Table 2 in every proposal. In this test case the business criticality is not con-
sidered. 
6.1.1 Proposal 1 
The raw results for proposal 1 are presented below. (Table 6.)  
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Table 6. Raw results for proposal 1 in test case 1. The table contains security scores 
calculated for every timestamp. The security score can vary between zero and 
ten. 
Timestamp Averages Case1 Case2 Case3 
1.1.2017 3,333333333 5 5 0 
1.2.2017 4,833333333 4,5 5 5 
1.3.2017 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 
1.4.2017 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 
1.5.2017 4,166666667 3,5 4,5 4,5 
1.6.2017 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 
1.7.2017 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 
1.8.2017 3,333333333 3 3,5 3,5 
1.9.2017 3 3 3 3 
1.10.2017 5,333333333 6,5 6,5 3 
1.11.2017 6,333333333 6 6,5 6,5 
1.12.2017 6 6 6 6 
1.1.2018 7,333333333 8 8 6 
1.2.2018 7,833333333 7,5 8 8 
1.3.2018 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,5 
1.4.2018 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,5 
1.5.2018 6,833333333 6,5 6,5 7,5 
1.6.2018 6,833333333 7,5 6,5 6,5 
1.7.2018 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,5 
1.8.2018 7,166666667 7 7 7,5 
1.9.2018 6,833333333 6,5 7 7 
1.10.2018 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 
1.11.2018 5,833333333 5,5 5,5 6,5 
1.12.2018 5,833333333 6,5 5,5 5,5 
1.1.2019 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 
1.2.2019 5,833333333 5,5 5,5 6,5 
1.3.2019 5,666666667 6 5,5 5,5 
1.4.2019 6 6 6 6 
1.5.2019 4,666666667 4 4 6 
1.6.2019 4,166666667 4,5 4 4 
1.7.2019 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 
1.8.2019 3,833333333 3,5 3,5 4,5 
1.9.2019 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 
1.10.2019 4,5 5 5 3,5 
1.11.2019 4,833333333 4,5 5 5 
1.12.2019 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 
1.1.2020 2,25 4,5 4,5 4,5 
1.2.2020 2,25 4,5 4,5 4,5 
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In addition, the following graph was generated from the data. (Figure 11.) The graph 
shows the effects of different vulnerability amounts to the security score when the calcu-
lations are done utilizing the proposal 1. 
 
Figure 11. Graph generated from the results. The y-axis presents the security scores 
and the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 11.), the raw data results (Table 6.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the more the case has critical vulnerabilities, 
the lower the security score will be and vice versa. In addition, the drop at the end of the 
graph originates from the fact the input file contains unknown systems which security 
score will be set to zero. This will affect the average in a major way. 
6.1.2 Proposal 2 
The raw results for proposal 2 are presented in the below table. (Table 7.) 
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Table 7. Raw results for proposal 2 in test case 1. The table contains security scores 
calculated for every timestamp. The security score can vary between zero and 
ten. 
Timestamp Averages Case1 Case2 Case3 
1.1.2017 4,8 7,2 7,2 0 
1.2.2017 7,06 6,78 7,2 7,2 
1.3.2017 6,78 6,78 6,78 6,78 
1.4.2017 6,6 6,51 6,51 6,78 
1.5.2017 6,216666667 5,63 6,51 6,51 
1.6.2017 5,63 5,63 5,63 5,63 
1.7.2017 5,403333333 5,29 5,29 5,63 
1.8.2017 5,136666667 4,83 5,29 5,29 
1.9.2017 4,83 4,83 4,83 4,83 
1.10.2017 7,15 8,31 8,31 4,83 
1.11.2017 8,17 7,89 8,31 8,31 
1.12.2017 7,89 7,89 7,89 7,89 
1.1.2018 8,656666667 9,04 9,04 7,89 
1.2.2018 8,996666667 8,91 9,04 9,04 
1.3.2018 8,91 8,91 8,91 8,91 
1.4.2018 8,58 8,58 8,58 8,58 
1.5.2018 8,213333333 8,03 8,03 8,58 
1.6.2018 8,213333333 8,58 8,03 8,03 
1.7.2018 8,58 8,58 8,58 8,58 
1.8.2018 8,493333333 8,45 8,45 8,58 
1.9.2018 8,18 7,64 8,45 8,45 
1.10.2018 7,64 7,64 7,64 7,64 
1.11.2018 7,273333333 7,09 7,09 7,64 
1.12.2018 7,203333333 7,43 7,09 7,09 
1.1.2019 7,43 7,43 7,43 7,43 
1.2.2019 7,25 7,16 7,16 7,43 
1.3.2019 7,09 6,95 7,16 7,16 
1.4.2019 6,95 6,95 6,95 6,95 
1.5.2019 6,183333333 5,8 5,8 6,95 
1.6.2019 5,733333333 5,6 5,8 5,8 
1.7.2019 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 
1.8.2019 5,2 5 5 5,6 
1.9.2019 5 5 5 5 
1.10.2019 5,72 6,08 6,08 5 
1.11.2019 6,033333333 5,94 6,08 6,08 
1.12.2019 5,94 5,94 5,94 5,94 
1.1.2020 2,97 5,94 5,94 5,94 
1.2.2020 2,97 5,94 5,94 5,94 
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The graph generated from the input data is presented below. (Figure 12.) The graph shows 
the effects of different vulnerabilities to the security score when the calculations are done 
utilizing the proposal 2. 
 
Figure 12. Graph generated from the results. The y-axis presents the security scores 
and the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 12.), the raw data results (Table 7.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the effects of adding different vulnerabilities 
are not considerable because the differences between the security scores are not signifi-
cant. This however does not concern the addition of critical vulnerabilities to the calcula-
tions. 
6.1.3 Proposal 3 
The results for proposal 3 are presented below. (Table 8.) 
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Table 8. Raw results for proposal 3 in test case 1. The table contains security scores 
calculated for every timestamp. The security score can vary between zero and 
ten. 
Timestamp Averages Case1 Case2 Case3 
1.1.2017 3,38 5,07 5,07 0 
1.2.2017 4,336666667 2,87 5,07 5,07 
1.3.2017 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 
1.4.2017 3,11 3,23 3,23 2,87 
1.5.2017 2,153333333 0 3,23 3,23 
1.6.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.7.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.8.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.9.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.10.2017 4,12 6,18 6,18 0 
1.11.2017 5,446666667 3,98 6,18 6,18 
1.12.2017 3,98 3,98 3,98 3,98 
1.1.2018 7,146666667 8,73 8,73 3,98 
1.2.2018 8,496666667 8,03 8,73 8,73 
1.3.2018 8,03 8,03 8,03 8,03 
1.4.2018 7,33 7,33 7,33 7,33 
1.5.2018 5,396666667 4,43 4,43 7,33 
1.6.2018 5,71 8,27 4,43 4,43 
1.7.2018 8,27 8,27 8,27 8,27 
1.8.2018 7,803333333 7,57 7,57 8,27 
1.9.2018 7,176666667 6,39 7,57 7,57 
1.10.2018 6,39 6,39 6,39 6,39 
1.11.2018 4,456666667 3,49 3,49 6,39 
1.12.2018 4,003333333 5,03 3,49 3,49 
1.1.2019 5,03 5,03 5,03 5,03 
1.2.2019 4,263333333 3,88 3,88 5,03 
1.3.2019 4,103333333 4,55 3,88 3,88 
1.4.2019 4,55 4,55 4,55 4,55 
1.5.2019 1,516666667 0 0 4,55 
1.6.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.7.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.8.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.9.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.10.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.11.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.12.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.1.2020 0 0 0 0 
1.2.2020 0 0 0 0 
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The graph generated from the input data is presented below. (Figure 13.) The graph shows 
the effects of different vulnerability amounts to the security score when the calculations 
are done utilizing the proposal 3. 
 
Figure 13. Graph generated from case data. The y-axis presents the security scores and 
the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 13.), the raw data results (Table 8.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the effects of adding different vulnerabilities 
are significant and the security scores are varying considerably. 
6.2 Test case 2 
In the second test case, the calculations are executed using the modified coefficients 
which were presented in Table 3 in every proposal. In this test case, the business criticality 
is considered. 
6.2.1 Proposal 1 
The raw results for proposal 1 are presented below. (Table 9.) 
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Table 9. Raw results for proposal 1 in test case 2. The table contains security scores 
calculated for every timestamp. The security score can vary between zero and 
ten. 
Timestamp Averages Case1 Case2 Case3 
1.1.2017 2,733333333 3,8 4,4 0 
1.2.2017 4,233333333 3,3 4,4 5 
1.3.2017 3,9 3,3 3,9 4,5 
1.4.2017 3,9 3,3 3,9 4,5 
1.5.2017 3,566666667 2,3 3,9 4,5 
1.6.2017 2,9 2,3 2,9 3,5 
1.7.2017 2,9 2,3 2,9 3,5 
1.8.2017 2,733333333 1,8 2,9 3,5 
1.9.2017 2,4 1,8 2,4 3 
1.10.2017 4,833333333 5,5 6 3 
1.11.2017 5,833333333 5 6 6,5 
1.12.2017 5,5 5 5,5 6 
1.1.2018 7,033333333 7,4 7,7 6 
1.2.2018 7,466666667 6,7 7,7 8 
1.3.2018 7,1 6,7 7,1 7,5 
1.4.2018 7,2 6,9 7,2 7,5 
1.5.2018 6,433333333 5,7 6,1 7,5 
1.6.2018 6,5 6,9 6,1 6,5 
1.7.2018 7,2 6,9 7,2 7,5 
1.8.2018 6,766666667 6,2 6,6 7,5 
1.9.2018 6,5 5,9 6,6 7 
1.10.2018 6,2 5,9 6,2 6,5 
1.11.2018 5,433333333 4,7 5,1 6,5 
1.12.2018 5,5 5,9 5,1 5,5 
1.1.2019 6,2 5,9 6,2 6,5 
1.2.2019 5,333333333 4,5 5 6,5 
1.3.2019 5,3 5,4 5 5,5 
1.4.2019 5,7 5,4 5,7 6 
1.5.2019 4,166666667 3 3,5 6 
1.6.2019 3,733333333 3,7 3,5 4 
1.7.2019 4,1 3,7 4,1 4,5 
1.8.2019 3,333333333 2,5 3 4,5 
1.9.2019 3 2,5 3 3,5 
1.10.2019 4,1 4,2 4,6 3,5 
1.11.2019 4,366666667 3,5 4,6 5 
1.12.2019 4 3,5 4 4,5 
1.1.2020 2 3,5 4 4,5 
1.2.2020 2 3,5 4 4,5 
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The graph generated from the input data is presented below. (Figure 14.) The graph shows 
the effects of different vulnerability amounts to the security score when the calculations 
are done considering the business criticality and utilizing proposal 1. 
 
Figure 14. Graph generated from case data. The y-axis presents the security scores and 
the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 14.), the raw data results (Table 9.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the effects of considering business criticality in 
the calculations will affect the security scores considerably. 
6.2.2 Proposal 2 
The results for proposal 2 are presented below. (Table 10.)  
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Table 10. Raw results for proposal 2 in test case 2. The table contains security scores 
calculated for every timestamp. The security score can vary between zero and 
ten. 
Timestamp Averages Case1 Case2 Case3 
1.1.2017 4,513 6,626 6,913 0 
1.2.2017 6,753666667 6,148 6,913 7,2 
1.3.2017 6,464 6,148 6,464 6,78 
1.4.2017 6,287 5,884 6,197 6,78 
1.5.2017 5,863 4,882 6,197 6,51 
1.6.2017 5,256 4,882 5,256 5,63 
1.7.2017 5,026333333 4,536 4,913 5,63 
1.8.2017 4,738333333 4,012 4,913 5,29 
1.9.2017 4,421 4,012 4,421 4,83 
1.10.2017 6,937 7,884 8,097 4,83 
1.11.2017 7,937666667 7,406 8,097 8,31 
1.12.2017 7,648 7,406 7,648 7,89 
1.1.2018 8,529666667 8,786 8,913 7,89 
1.2.2018 8,852333333 8,604 8,913 9,04 
1.3.2018 8,757 8,604 8,757 8,91 
1.4.2018 8,421 8,262 8,421 8,58 
1.5.2018 7,999333333 7,602 7,816 8,58 
1.6.2018 8,051333333 8,308 7,816 8,03 
1.7.2018 8,444 8,308 8,444 8,58 
1.8.2018 8,331333333 8,126 8,288 8,58 
1.9.2018 7,993333333 7,242 8,288 8,45 
1.10.2018 7,441 7,242 7,441 7,64 
1.11.2018 7,019333333 6,582 6,836 7,64 
1.12.2018 6,989333333 7,042 6,836 7,09 
1.1.2019 7,236 7,042 7,236 7,43 
1.2.2019 7,002 6,664 6,912 7,43 
1.3.2019 6,857333333 6,5 6,912 7,16 
1.4.2019 6,725 6,5 6,725 6,95 
1.5.2019 5,843333333 5,12 5,46 6,95 
1.6.2019 5,41 4,97 5,46 5,8 
1.7.2019 5,285 4,97 5,285 5,6 
1.8.2019 4,825 4,25 4,625 5,6 
1.9.2019 4,625 4,25 4,625 5 
1.10.2019 5,436 5,512 5,796 5 
1.11.2019 5,730666667 5,316 5,796 6,08 
1.12.2019 5,628 5,316 5,628 5,94 
1.1.2020 2,814 5,316 5,628 5,94 
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The graph generated from the input data is presented below. (Figure 15.) The graph shows 
the effects of different vulnerability amounts to the security score when the calculations 
are done considering the business criticality and utilizing proposal 2. 
 
Figure 15. Graph generated from case data. The y-axis presents the security scores and 
the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 15.), the raw data results (Table 10.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the effects of considering business criticality in 
the calculations will affect the security secure slightly. 
6.2.3 Proposal 3 
The results for proposal 3 are presented below. (Table 11.)  
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Table 11. Raw results for proposal 3 in test case 2. The table contains security scores 
calculated for every timestamp. The security score can vary between zero and 
ten. 
Timestamp Averages Case1 Case2 Case3 
1.1.2017 2,792 3,894 4,482 0 
1.2.2017 3,648666667 1,394 4,482 5,07 
1.3.2017 2,132 1,394 2,132 2,87 
1.4.2017 2,461 1,932 2,581 2,87 
1.5.2017 1,937 0 2,581 3,23 
1.6.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.7.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.8.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.9.2017 0 0 0 0 
1.10.2017 3,606 5,152 5,666 0 
1.11.2017 4,832666667 2,652 5,666 6,18 
1.12.2017 3,316 2,652 3,316 3,98 
1.1.2018 6,957666667 8,352 8,541 3,98 
1.2.2018 8,214333333 7,372 8,541 8,73 
1.3.2018 7,701 7,372 7,701 8,03 
1.4.2018 7,046 6,762 7,046 7,33 
1.5.2018 4,822666667 3,282 3,856 7,33 
1.6.2018 5,386666667 7,874 3,856 4,43 
1.7.2018 8,072 7,874 8,072 8,27 
1.8.2018 7,465333333 6,894 7,232 8,27 
1.9.2018 6,848 5,742 7,232 7,57 
1.10.2018 6,066 5,742 6,066 6,39 
1.11.2018 3,842666667 2,262 2,876 6,39 
1.12.2018 3,562666667 4,322 2,876 3,49 
1.1.2019 4,676 4,322 4,676 5,03 
1.2.2019 3,679333333 2,712 3,296 5,03 
1.3.2019 3,652 3,78 3,296 3,88 
1.4.2019 4,165 3,78 4,165 4,55 
1.5.2019 1,516666667 0 0 4,55 
1.6.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.7.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.8.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.9.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.10.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.11.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.12.2019 0 0 0 0 
1.1.2020 0 0 0 0 
1.2.2020 0 0 0 0 
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The graph generated from the input data is presented below. (Figure 16.) The graph shows 
the effects of different vulnerability amounts to the security score when the calculations 
are done considering the business criticality and utilizing proposal 3. 
   
Figure 16. Graph generated from case data. The y-axis presents the security scores and 
the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 16.), the raw data results (Table 11.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the effects of considering business criticality in 
the calculations will affect the security scores considerably. 
6.3 Test case 3 
The third test case is used for the weighted average calculations between every proposal. 
The results of this test case are utilized in the analysis section to determine whether the 
business criticality should be considered in the system or environment level. 
6.3.1 Proposal 1 
The results for proposal 1 are presented below. (Table 12.) 
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Table 12. Raw results for proposal 1 in test case 3. The table contains weighted and 
arithmetic averages calculated for every timestamp. The security score can 
vary between zero and ten. 
Timestamp Weighted average (all cases) Average (all cases) 
1.1.2017 3,888888889 3,333333333 
1.2.2017 4,777777778 4,833333333 
1.3.2017 4,5 4,5 
1.4.2017 4,5 4,5 
1.5.2017 4,055555556 4,166666667 
1.6.2017 3,5 3,5 
1.7.2017 3,5 3,5 
1.8.2017 3,277777778 3,333333333 
1.9.2017 3 3 
1.10.2017 5,722222222 5,333333333 
1.11.2017 6,277777778 6,333333333 
1.12.2017 6 6 
1.1.2018 7,555555556 7,333333333 
1.2.2018 7,777777778 7,833333333 
1.3.2018 7,5 7,5 
1.4.2018 7,5 7,5 
1.5.2018 6,722222222 6,833333333 
1.6.2018 6,944444444 6,833333333 
1.7.2018 7,5 7,5 
1.8.2018 7,111111111 7,166666667 
1.9.2018 6,777777778 6,833333333 
1.10.2018 6,5 6,5 
1.11.2018 5,722222222 5,833333333 
1.12.2018 5,944444444 5,833333333 
1.1.2019 6,5 6,5 
1.2.2019 5,722222222 5,833333333 
1.3.2019 5,722222222 5,666666667 
1.4.2019 6 6 
1.5.2019 4,444444444 4,666666667 
1.6.2019 4,222222222 4,166666667 
1.7.2019 4,5 4,5 
1.8.2019 3,722222222 3,833333333 
1.9.2019 3,5 3,5 
1.10.2019 4,666666667 4,5 
1.11.2019 4,777777778 4,833333333 
1.12.2019 4,5 4,5 
1.1.2020 2,7 2,25 
1.2.2020 2,7 2,25 
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The graph generated from the input data is presented below. (Figure 17.) The graph shows 
the effects of proposal 1 to the average calculations. 
 
Figure 17. The graph generated from the output data. The y-axis presents the averages 
and the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 17.), the raw data results (Table 12.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the weighted and arithmetic averages are almost 
the same in most cases. However, in some cases the weighted average is higher which 
indicates that there are more cases with high business criticality and security scores. 
6.3.2 Proposal 2 
The results for proposal 2 are presented below. (Table 13.) 
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Table 13. Raw results for proposal 2 in test case 3. The table contains weighted and 
arithmetic averages calculated for every timestamp. The security score can 
vary between zero and ten. 
Timestamp Weighted average (all cases) Average (all cases) 
1.1.2017 5,6 4,8 
1.2.2017 7,013333333 7,06 
1.3.2017 6,78 6,78 
1.4.2017 6,57 6,6 
1.5.2017 6,118888889 6,216666667 
1.6.2017 5,63 5,63 
1.7.2017 5,365555556 5,403333333 
1.8.2017 5,085555556 5,136666667 
1.9.2017 4,83 4,83 
1.10.2017 7,536666667 7,15 
1.11.2017 8,123333333 8,17 
1.12.2017 7,89 7,89 
1.1.2018 8,784444444 8,656666667 
1.2.2018 8,982222222 8,996666667 
1.3.2018 8,91 8,91 
1.4.2018 8,58 8,58 
1.5.2018 8,152222222 8,213333333 
1.6.2018 8,274444444 8,213333333 
1.7.2018 8,58 8,58 
1.8.2018 8,478888889 8,493333333 
1.9.2018 8,09 8,18 
1.10.2018 7,64 7,64 
1.11.2018 7,212222222 7,273333333 
1.12.2018 7,241111111 7,203333333 
1.1.2019 7,43 7,43 
1.2.2019 7,22 7,25 
1.3.2019 7,066666667 7,09 
1.4.2019 6,95 6,95 
1.5.2019 6,055555556 6,183333333 
1.6.2019 5,711111111 5,733333333 
1.7.2019 5,6 5,6 
1.8.2019 5,133333333 5,2 
1.9.2019 5 5 
1.10.2019 5,84 5,72 
1.11.2019 6,017777778 6,033333333 
1.12.2019 5,94 5,94 
1.1.2020 3,564 2,97 
1.2.2020 3,564 2,97 
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The graph generated from the output data is presented below. (Figure 18.) The graph 
shows the effects of proposal 2 to the average calculations. 
 
Figure 18. The graph generated from the output data. The y-axis presents the averages 
and the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 18.), the raw data results (Table 13.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the weighted and arithmetic averages are almost 
the same in most cases. However, in some cases the weighted average will be higher than 
the arithmetic average and vice versa 
6.3.3 Proposal 3 
The results for proposal 3 are presented below. (Table 14.)  
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Table 14. Raw results for proposal 3 in test case 3. The table contains the weighted and 
arithmetic averages calculated for every timestamp. The security score can 
vary between zero and ten. 
Timestamp Weighted average (all cases) Average (all cases) 
1.1.2017 3,943333333 3,38 
1.2.2017 4,092222222 4,336666667 
1.3.2017 2,87 2,87 
1.4.2017 3,15 3,11 
1.5.2017 1,794444444 2,153333333 
1.6.2017 0 0 
1.7.2017 0 0 
1.8.2017 0 0 
1.9.2017 0 0 
1.10.2017 4,806666667 4,12 
1.11.2017 5,202222222 5,446666667 
1.12.2017 3,98 3,98 
1.1.2018 7,674444444 7,146666667 
1.2.2018 8,418888889 8,496666667 
1.3.2018 8,03 8,03 
1.4.2018 7,33 7,33 
1.5.2018 5,074444444 5,396666667 
1.6.2018 6,136666667 5,71 
1.7.2018 8,27 8,27 
1.8.2018 7,725555556 7,803333333 
1.9.2018 7,045555556 7,176666667 
1.10.2018 6,39 6,39 
1.11.2018 4,134444444 4,456666667 
1.12.2018 4,174444444 4,003333333 
1.1.2019 5,03 5,03 
1.2.2019 4,135555556 4,263333333 
1.3.2019 4,177777778 4,103333333 
1.4.2019 4,55 4,55 
1.5.2019 1,011111111 1,516666667 
1.6.2019 0 0 
1.7.2019 0 0 
1.8.2019 0 0 
1.9.2019 0 0 
1.10.2019 0 0 
1.11.2019 0 0 
1.12.2019 0 0 
1.1.2020 0 0 
1.2.2020 0 0 
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The graph generated from the output data is presented below. (Figure 19.) The graph 
shows the effects of proposal 3 to the average calculations. 
 
Figure 19. The graph generated from the output data. The y-axis presents the averages 
and the x-axis presents the timestamps. 
By examining the above figure (Figure 19.), the raw data results (Table 14.) and the input 
file (Appendix A) it can be indicated that the weighted and arithmetic averages are almost 
the same in most cases.  
6.4 Comparison and discussion between proposals 
In this chapter, every test case will be compared together and criticized. The comparison 
process is divided into three different domains which are the comparison with base coef-
ficient calculation results, comparison between base coefficient and modified coefficient 
calculations and the modified coefficient calculations comparison to weighted average. 
The results presented earlier for every test case and the input file will be used for the 
comparison activities. 
  
 71 
6.4.1 With base coefficients 
Calculations with base coefficients references the test case 1 in which every proposal was 
used to calculate the system security score using the coefficients described in Table 2. 
For easier comparison, the following table was constructed from the output data. (Table 
15.) Entries for the table was selected from the output data so that it would present clearly 
the effects of adding distinct vulnerabilities to the calculations. 
Table 15. Security scores gathered from the outputs. Score (1) references to proposal 1, 
Score (2) references to proposal 2 and Score (3) references to proposal 3 
Criticals Majors Minors Score (1) Score (2) Score (3) 
- 6.5 3.4,2.8 8 9.4 8.73 
- 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 6.5 8.31 6.39 
- 6.5,6.0,5.5 3.4,2.8 6 7.89 3.98 
7.4 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 5 7.2 5.07 
7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 3.5 5.63 0 
7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0 3,4 3 4.83 0 
By examining the above table (Table 15.), it can be clearly indicated that in most cases 
by adding more severe vulnerabilities to the calculations, the security score of the system 
will drop. However, in the third score column which represents the third proposal, the 
security score drops dramatically after adding one major vulnerability to the column. This 
behaviour is expected to some extent but the security score then raises again after one 
critical vulnerability is added and one major vulnerability is removed from the calcula-
tions. Expected behaviour in that case should be that the security score would be lower 
or at least the close to the same value as in the previous calculations. 
Another assumption in this case would be that the presence of critical vulnerabilities 
should lower the score significantly. This assumption is fulfilled partly by the first and 
second proposal. However, the second proposals score appears too permissive compared 
to the amount of critical vulnerabilities in the system. The first proposal appears to fulfil 
this assumption the best compared to other proposals. 
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6.4.2 Base versus modified coefficients 
Modified coefficients were used in the calculations to factor in business criticality of the 
target system. The higher the business criticality, the more it will affect the final score as 
a lowering factor. The following table contains data from all the proposals and scores 
which have also business criticalities factored in the calculations (Table 16.) Entries in 
the table have been selected respecting the same principle as in base coefficient effect 
comparison. 
Table 16. Security scores gathered from the outputs. Score (1) references to proposal 1, 
Score (2) references to proposal 2 and Score (3) references to proposal 3 
Business criticality Criticals Majors Minors Score (1) Score (2) Score (3) 
normal - 6.5 3.4,2.8 8 9.4 8.73 
moderate - 6.5 3.4,2.8 7.7 8.913 8.541 
high - 6.5 3.4,2.8 7.4 8.786 8.352 
       
normal - 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 6.5 8.31 6.39 
moderate - 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 6.2 8.097 5.666 
high - 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 5.9 7.884 5.152 
       
normal - 6.5,6.0,5.5 3.4,2.8 6 7.89 3.98 
moderate - 6.5,6.0,5.5 3.4,2.8 5.5 7.648 3.316 
high - 6.5,6.0,5.5 3.4,2.8 5 7.406 2.652 
       
normal 7.4 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 5 7.2 5.07 
moderate 7.4 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 4.4 6.913 4.482 
high 7.4 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 3.8 6.626 3.894 
       
normal 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 3.5 5.63 0 
moderate 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 2.9 5.256 0 
high 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 2.3 4.882 0 
       
normal 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0 3,4 3 4.83 0 
moderate 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0 3,4 2.4 4.412 0 
high 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0 3,4 1.8 4.012 0 
Like in the base coefficient comparison, it can be clearly indicated from the above table 
(Table 16.) that the security scores are lowering whenever more severe vulnerabilities are 
added in most of the proposals. In this case, the business criticality will also affect the 
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security score of the system as a modifying factor. By adding the business criticality to 
the calculations, the score will offer a more precise picture of the security state of the 
system and environment. This is because in a case where a highly business critical bank-
ing system which has the same vulnerabilities as an application which does not contain 
business critical data, should have a lower security score because of the nature and criti-
cality of the data it stores and handles. Additionally, if the application has critical vulner-
abilities, it usually means that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data are 
at risk and in an application which handles and stores sensitive data the consequences of 
potential exploit and compromise can be more severe. 
6.4.3 Modified coefficients versus weighted average 
Modified coefficients and weighted average were used in the calculations to offer solu-
tions and alternatives on how to consider the business criticality of the system. The mod-
ified coefficient solution considers the business criticality in system level and the 
weighted average considers the business criticality in the environment level. Tables and 
figures presented in the test case 2 and 3 were used in the comparison process. 
Both, the modified coefficient and weighted average consider the business criticality of 
the system which is beneficial in the security state description. However, the weighted 
average describes better the whole environments security level because it weights distinct 
systems with different weights based on the business criticality of the system and consid-
ers them in the average calculations. On the other hand, if the systems security scores are 
calculated without using the modified coefficients it can offer a corrupted view of the real 
security state of a single system. This can be misleading if the scores are examined in the 
system level. Thus, the calculations should be done on the system level with modified 
coefficients. However, the weighted average could still be added to the calculations to 
offer a more specify description of the whole environments state. 
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6.4.4 Criticism and comparison to available frameworks 
Although one of the requirements was to develop the security evaluation method as sim-
ple as possible, the end result can be too simple and straightforward for some cases. The 
already available frameworks contain many levels and categories which can be used to 
evaluate the systems and environments security state. Although in some cases the process 
can become more time consuming by adding more layers, all of the layers are imple-
mented for a reason in these frameworks. Thus, the already available frameworks are 
recommended if the system or environment demands a more extended approach in terms 
of security.  
The unknown system considerations in the calculations may be too strict and harsh for 
some situations. This can lead to misleading information regarding the true security state 
of the system and the whole environment. This can happen for example when some third-
party has audited the system and the results of the audit are not known. 
The evaluation process does not categorize distinct issues. For example, in the NIST cyber 
security framework the issues are categorized into different domains such as asset and 
identity management. The approach could be used also in the developed security evalua-
tion process to provide a more extended approach to the security of the system and the 
whole environment. This information could also be used to detect weaknesses in the de-
velopment process of the application or system.  
The CVSS scores contain four different levels which are minor, major, high and critical. 
This approach could also be used in the new security state evaluation process to better 
address the severity of the vulnerability which is present in the system to the organization 
and the effects of the vulnerability to the security score.  Occasionally, in a case where 
CVSS score is distinctly over the critical threshold used in the new security evaluation 
process, the severity and consequences of exploiting the vulnerability may be clearly 
higher. In these cases, these vulnerabilities could be weighted more by implementing a 
fourth level in to the new security evaluation process. 
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Finally, new technologies and vulnerabilities are emerging every day and therefore any 
digital system can never be interpreted as fully secure. This also applies to the systems 
which security is evaluated with audits and with the new security evaluation process.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of the study was to develop a security evaluation process which would be 
easy for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to implement and utilize in their con-
tinuous information or cyber security processes. In addition, the objective was to develop 
a script which automates the calculations and can be used in testing. These objectives 
were fulfilled during the study. The designed information security evaluation method was 
compared and criticized against two existing security frameworks which are the NIST 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) cyber security framework and CIS 
(Center for Information Security) Critical Security Controls. Finally, the new design was 
tested against three different test cases in order to verify the correct functioning of the 
new security evaluation method and to compare the proposals together. The results are 
mainly applicable for the company who ordered the thesis because the new security eval-
uation method was designed based on the requirements stated by them. However, if an 
another principal wants to evaluate the security state of a system and has the same re-
quirements for the evaluation process, the developed evaluation method can possibly be 
applied to that companies’ processes also. 
The study included three different proposals which were constructed according to audit 
results. The features that were taken into account in the proposals were the frequency of 
issues per vulnerability rating and the CVSS scores. In addition, three test cases were 
implemented for testing. These test cases included tests with base coefficients, with mod-
ified coefficients and the weighted average calculations. The implemented test cases and 
the results were compared in three distinct scenarios which were the comparison between 
proposals with base coefficients, modified coefficients and with the weighted average. 
The results indicated that the best option for the evaluation process was the first proposal 
with modified coefficients and with weighted average. 
When considering all the discussed proposals, results and facts, the best option right now 
is to implement the proposal 1 with business criticality and weighted average calculations. 
The mentioned proposal appeared to consider best the effects of adding different vulner-
abilities to the system. In addition, by adding the business criticality and weighted average 
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to the proposal, the calculations would describe better the state of security in the system 
and in the environment. Although this proposal was valued as the best solution right now, 
in the future it is recommended to examine the effects of different coefficients and modify 
them in order to achieve a more comprehensive description of the security state. 
Additionally, in order to perfect the calculation process, the calculations should be con-
tinuously developed. One feasible development proposal could be that the new security 
evaluation process could also be developed and approached so that the input would also 
contain information about the target system and not only audit results. By organizing the 
input so, the security of the system could be evaluated based on the operations and actions 
that have been executed against the system. These operations which would be considered 
in the evaluation process could be for example technical audit, technical review, incident 
response plan and so on. For instance, if a technical audit has only been executed against 
the system, the security score would be affected negatively because other important se-
curity operations and actions have not been executed. This approach would offer a more 
extended outlook of the security state. 
Finally, the new security evaluation process could be integrated as a part of a web service 
which could parse the audit data and calculate the target systems security level automati-
cally in the backend and display the security states in the client side. By implementing 
the security evaluation process as a part of web service, it would offer scalability, and the 
target systems security state evaluation could be implemented so that it would automati-
cally update based on different features such as time.  
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APPENDIX A 
Case Type Timestamp Criti-
cals/High 
Majors/Me-
dium 
Mi-
nors/Low 
Audited Critical-
ity 
Case1 audit 1.1.2017 7,4 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.1.2017 7,4 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.2.2017 7,4 6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.2.2017 7,4 6.5,5.5,6.0 3.4,2.8 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.3.2017 7,4 6.5,5.5,6.0 3.4,2.8 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.3.2017 7,4 6.5,5.5,6.0 3.4,2.8 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.4.2017 7.4,8.6 6,5 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.4.2017 7.4,8.6 6,5 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.5.2017 7.4,8.6 6,5 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.5.2017 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.6.2017 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.6.2017 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.7.2017 7.4,8.6,9.0 6,5 3.4,2.8 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.7.2017 7.4,8.6,9.0 6,5 3.4,2.8 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.8.2017 7.4,8.6,9.0 6,5 3.4,2.8 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.8.2017 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0 3,4 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.9.2017 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0 3,4 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.9.2017 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0 3,4 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.10.2017  6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.10.2017  6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.11.2017  6.5,6.0 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.11.2017  6.5,6.0,5.5 3.4,2.8 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.12.2017  6.5,6.0,5.5 3.4,2.8 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.12.2017  6.5,6.0,5.5 3.4,2.8 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.1.2018  6,5 3.4,2.8 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.1.2018  6,5 3.4,2.8 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.2.2018  6,5 3.4,2.8 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.2.2018  6,5 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.3.2018  6,5 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.3.2018  6,5 3.4,2.8,2.6 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.4.2018  6.5,6.0 3,4 1 high 
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Case2 audit 1.4.2018  6.5,6.0 3,4 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.4.2018  6.5,6.0 3,4 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.5.2018  6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.5.2018  6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.6.2018  6.5,6.0,5.5 3,4 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.6.2018 7,4  3.4,2.8 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.7.2018 7,4  3.4,2.8 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.7.2018 7,4  3.4,2.8 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.8.2018 7,4  3.4,2.8,2.6 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.8.2018 7,4  3.4,2.8,2.6 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.9.2018 7,4  3.4,2.8,2.6 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.9.2018 7,4 6.5,6.0  1 high 
Case2 audit 1.10.2018 7,4 6.5,6.0  1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.10.2018 7,4 6.5,6.0  1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.11.2018 7,4 6.5,6.0,5.5  1 high 
Case2 audit 1.11.2018 7,4 6.5,6.0,5.5  1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.12.2018 7,4 6.5,6.0,5.5  1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.12.2018 7.4,8.6  3,4 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.1.2019 7.4,8.6  3,4 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.1.2019 7.4,8.6  3,4 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.2.2019 7.4,8.6  3.4,2.8,2.6 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.2.2019 7.4,8.6  3.4,2.8,2.6 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.3.2019 7.4,8.6  3.4,2.8,2.6 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.3.2019 7.4,8.6 6,5  1 high 
Case2 audit 1.4.2019 7.4,8.6 6,5  1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.4.2019 7.4,8.6 6,5  1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.5.2019 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5  1 high 
Case2 audit 1.5.2019 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5  1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.6.2019 7.4,8.6 6.5,6.0,5.5  1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.6.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0 6,5  1 high 
Case2 audit 1.7.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0 6,5  1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.7.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0 6,5  1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.8.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0  1 high 
Case2 audit 1.8.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0  1 moder-
ate 
 86 
Case3 audit 1.9.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0 6.5,6.0  1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.10.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0  3,4 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.10.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0  3,4 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.11.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0  3,4 1 normal 
Case1 audit 1.11.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0  3.4,2.8 1 high 
Case2 audit 1.12.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0  3.4,2.8 1 moder-
ate 
Case3 audit 1.12.2019 7.4,8.6,9.0  3.4,2.8 1 normal 
Case10 audit 1.1.2020    0  
Case11 audit 1.1.2020    0  
Case12 audit 1.1.2020    0  
 
 
